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1. Introduction 
he Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is an alliance between six Middle 
Eastern membernations: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman. The council was 
established in May 1981 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia with the goals of political and 
economic unification. A “Supreme Council” is the joint decision-making tool of 
the GCC and is made up of heads of state from the respective member states. An 
appointed president oversees the council. The presidency rotates annually among 
the six heads of state.i 
Since inception, the GCC has held the goal of creating a unified currency. The 
Council sees widespread opportunity for mutual benefit across membernations. A 
unified currency would see the abolition of exchange rates between national 
currencies, breaking down a barrier to trade between the countries and expanding 
trade opportunities. This would make the members of the GCC more competitive, 
in addition to effectively unifying markets across the six nations. A unification of 
markets would also result in a unification of monetary and economic policy that 
would strengthen ties between member states and ultimately assist in reaching the 
wider political goals of the council.ii 
As the next section outlines in detail, the GCC has failed to implement a 
currency union so far. The subsequent sections of this paper analyze the strategies 
of existing major currency unions and one past currency union in the hopes of 
applying them to a potential currency union in the GCC. The main aspects studied 
are the governance structures and the profit sharing schemes of each of the 
respective currency unions. The Eastern Caribbean Currency Union offers an 
interesting potential solution to the GCC’s unique political problem in the form of 
offering each member of its governing body an equal vote. The now defunct 
Malayan Currency Board implemented a profit sharing scheme that could be 
applicable to the GCC. The European Central Bank uses an unbalanced voting 
right rotation system, but has a streamlined and efficient organizational structure 
that could be used to the benefit of the GCC. The CFA franc zone, which is 
actually two currency unions in Africa, is also discussed, but is found to be less 
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relevant to the GCC. This is due to the oversight of the French central bank and 
France’s support for the pegged exchange rate of the CFA francs to the French 
franc and later the euro. 
 
2. The GCC’s failure to implement a Unified Currency 
One condition for the success of any monetary union is a degree of political 
cooperation, although, as we will see, the level of cooperation has varied widely 
across currency unions. There are also significant economic factors that play into 
the politics of forming a unified currency.  In recent history, the GCC nations have 
not exhibited the prerequisite cooperative attitudes for the establishment of a 
unified currency (Kholifey, & AlReshan, n.d.). Oman pulled out of the unified 
currency agreement in 2006 due to concerns about its ability to meet the criteria set 
forth for the unified currency. These concerns were mainly related to maintaining a 
specific level of debt as a portion of GDP. Similar concerns for the UAE caused the 
country’s withdrawal from discussions in 2009. Oman’s concerns point to a larger 
issue with the economic compatibility of the GCC when it comes to the sizes of 
their respective economies.  Figure1 shows the GDP of the countries of the GCC. 
There is a great disparity in size between the economies. Saudi Arabia is far and 
away the largest economy, with a GDP of $678 billion. The UAE is the second-
largest economy, with a GDP of $378 billion. Saudi Arabia is has a greater GDP 
than most of the other GCC countries combined. This massive gap in economic 
size is another contributing factor to situations like the one that transpired with 
Oman. There must be monetary policy set in place when forming the unified 
currency that levels the playing field between the membernations. Saudi Arabia 
may be economically ready for a unified currency, but if the other nations in the 
council are not prepared, the unified currency is bound to fail. As a result, this 
paper will focus on suggesting monetary policies and institutional arrangements 
that could help mitigate the issues that arise from this economic disparity, using 
successful monetary unions as inspiration for solutions. 
 
 
Figure 1. GDP of GCC Member States in Billions of USD, 2017 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Data Mapper, 2017. 
 
3. An Overview of Some Successful Monetary Unions 
The monetary unions that will be examined in this paper are the Eastern 
Caribbean Currency Union, Malayan Currency Board, European Monetary Union, 
and CFA franc zone. All are currency unions founded since World War II and each 
comprisesor has comprised three or more independent countries. The latter criteria 
was chosen to exclude currency unions between only two countries, which would 
not provide an applicable analogue for the GCC since it is made up of several 
countries. A currency union between two countries lacks the political and 
governing complexity that is found in currency unions between more countries.  
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This paper will use a specific framework to analyze the previously mentioned 
currency unions and then offer suggestions as to how to apply previously 
successful policies to the GCC and its potential currency union. The first step of 
the process is to outline the details of each of the currency unions, how they 
operate, and how they were formed. This will give insight as to how the GCC 
could establish its own currency union in the future. Details include the members 
of the union, whether the currency is linked to another currency, the size of the 
central bank assets by the end of 2016, and any allegiance to a political union. 
The second step is to outline the legal framework and governance of the 
currency union. This is mainly encompassed by how the currency union was 
adopted, and, most importantly, how the governance of the currency board is 
implemented. The manner in which the currency union distribute profits generated 
from central banking activities among its constituents is the third step in the 
analysis. Finally, any changes to governance as a result of historical controversy 
will be noted. 
 
4. Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU) 
4.1. Basic Facts 
The Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU) is made up of six former 
British colonies - Antigua and Barbuda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines, Dominica, and Grenada - plus two British overseas 
territories, Anguilla and Montserrat. It was formed in 1983 and is governed by the 
Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB), headquartered in Basseterre, Saint Kitts. 
The members of the ECCU use a common currency called the Eastern Caribbean 
dollar, which is pegged to the U.S. dollar at 2.70 ECD to 1 USD (Van Beek, et. al., 
2000). At the end of 2016, the ECCU held net assets (foreign and domestic) worth 
15.782 billion ECD (IMF, 2017). 
The ECCB is the successor to the British Caribbean Currency Board and the 
East Caribbean Currency Authority. The currency board was established in 1951 as 
an economic component of the stillborn West Indies Federation. By 1965 the two 
largest members of the currency board, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago, had left 
to establish their own central banks. The remaining members converted the 
currency board into the currency authority, which had greater discretionary powers 
but not all those typical of a full-fledged central bank. Barbados left to establish its 
own central bank in 1972. In 1976 the remaining members switched the anchor 
currency from the pound sterling to the U.S. dollar at the existing cross rate, and in 
1983 they converted the currency authority into a full-fledged central bank. The 
members of the ECCU are also part of a political union called the Organization of 
Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). The organization was established in 1981 by the 
signing of the Treaty of Basseterre, with the aim of creating economic unity and 
protecting human and legal rights. In 2010, the treaty was revised to create an 
economic union similar to that of the European Union. It established a unified 
financial and economic space in which goods can move freely and monetary policy 
was made uniform.iii 
 
4.2. Legal Matters and Governance 
The ECCB Agreement Act of 1983 iv  specified the legal framework and 
governance of the new central bank. Aside from establishing the bank as an 
independent legal entity, Part II of the agreement also outlined the main objectives 
of the central bank. They are: (1) “to regulate the availability of money and credit”; 
(2) “to promote and maintain monetary stability”; (3) “to promote credit and 
exchange conditions and a sound financial structure conducive to the balanced 
growth and development of the economies of the territories of the Participating 
Governments”; and (4) “to actively promote through means consistent with its 
other objectives the economic development of the territories of the Participating 
Governments.” 
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The agreement also establishes in Part IIA the central bank’s powers in times of 
special emergency. Emergencies, in this case, are times in which the bank 
perceives the interests of the people to be endangered, or a financial institution is in 
imminent danger of failing to meet its obligations. This section gives the central 
bank the ability to investigate, seize control of, and even restructure the capital 
base of a financial institution, among other powers, during times of emergency. 
As for governance, the agreement outlines in Part IV how the central bank will 
be managed. The central bank’s governing body is divided into two main groups, 
the Monetary Council and the Board of Directors. Monetary and credit policy is 
determined by the Monetary Council as described in Article 7 of the agreement. 
Each member country appoints one minister to the council, who has the right to a 
single vote. The ministers elect a Chairman of the council, who has the right to a 
single vote, in addition to the ability to break a tie with a casting vote. Decisions 
are made with a simple majority of present ministers, with a required quorum of 
five of the six member countries. General administration of the central bank and 
policy decisions are entrusted to the Board of Directors. Directors are selected by 
member nations just like the Monetary Council. The Governor and Deputy 
Governor of the Board of Directors are appointed by the Monetary Council and 
serves for terms of up to five consecutive years. The Governor (or in his place the 
Deputy Governor) has no vote except in the event of a tie. In essence, the Board of 
Directors acts as the embodiment of the bank, and the Governor has the power to 
take action on behalf of the central bank such as signing documents. The Monetary 
Council, on the other hand, is responsible for making the broad monetary and 
credit policies that the central bank will implement. 
The ECCB Agreement does not specify a particular exchange rate or exchange 
rate policy for the Eastern Caribbean dollar. It does however specify that external 
reserves must equal at least 60 percent of the ECCB’s currency in circulation and 
demand liabilities—in other words, the monetary base. In addition, the agreement 
outlines a policy for the establishment and maintenance of a general reserve. At the 
end of every fiscal year, the ECCB’s general reserve holdings must be equal to no 
less than 5 percent of the bank’s demand liabilities. Should the reserve fall below 5 
percent, any net profits generated by the bank’s activities are used to replenish the 
general reserve up to 10 percent of demand liabilities. The Agreement does not 
specify capital contributions, which could eventually threaten the currency union 
should tensions arise over uneven contribution. Recent publications by the IMF and 
World Bank have called on the ECCB to amend their policies to set a minimum 
capital contribution for admittance into the ECCU (IMF, 2017). 
 
4.3. Applying the ECCB’s Legal Structure to the GCC 
By inspecting the governance structure of the ECCB, we can identify many 
potentially useful ideas for the GCC. One important thing to note is the simplicity 
of the structure of the bank’s governing bodies. Although the member nations 
making up the ECCB are similar in size, giving each country the ability to appoint 
a minister and director of its choice, each with equal voting power, equalizes power 
differences between the nations. When considering the nations of the GCC, a 
massive hurdle in the path of establishing a unified currency is that the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia is so much larger than the other countries. By giving each country 
equal voting rights on both boards, the political weight of each ECCB member 
country is not determined by the size of its economy. Doing likewise in the GCC 
would encourage the smaller countries to join the currency union, as they would 
have decision power disproportionate to their economic size. 
A second useful idea is the ability of the ECCB Monetary Council to appoint 
the Governor of the Board of Directors. In the GCC, Saudi Arabia has historically 
dominated political discussions due to its sheer size. Allowing Saudi Arabia only 
one vote and the other five, smaller nations one vote each would give the other 
nations the ability to appoint a Governor who is not from Saudi Arabia. This would 
give them the opportunity to have more control over the currency union than if 
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Saudi Arabia were to have representatives in locked into position of power on both 
governing bodies. 
That being said, there are some aspects of the ECCB model that likely would 
not be successful when applied to the GCC currency union. The existence of two 
separate governing bodies that appear to have similar, nearly overlapping sets of 
responsibilities could prove to be detrimental to the GCC union. The Middle East is 
already riddled by bureaucracy, and adding additional layers of complexity would 
only slow decision-making. The countries of the GCC have tried repeatedly to 
implement a currency union, with little success. They have already demonstrated 
an ability to defer decisions and delay implementation, so putting in place two 
separate governing bodies would only hinder the central bank’s ability to operate 
efficiently. That is especially the case considering the political volatility of the 
member nations and their interactions. Hence, using one committee, the Board of 
Directors, to administer the central bank would likely be more efficient in the GCC 
union’s case. 
 
4.4. Profit Sharing 
A central bank, like other types of banks, performs activities that generate 
revenue. Revenue comes from interest on loans to commercial banks or other 
entities as well as from interest and capital gains on domestic government 
securities and foreign securities. As the profits of a central bank are normally kept 
by its respective country, in the case of monetary unions one of the key monetary 
policy decisions is how to distribute profits among member nations. Here again the 
ECCB offers an interesting model. 
The Eastern Caribbean Central Bank Act specifies that net profits generated by 
the end of the fiscal year be dispersed among member nations in proportion to the 
amount of currency in circulation in the respective country.vThe ECCU’s longevity 
indicates that this redistribution policy has not caused significant strife between the 
member nations. However, this may be because the members of the ECCU are all 
relatively similar in size. 
Figure 2 below shows the GDP in billions of USD for each member of the 
ECCU. The largest country in the currency union – Saint Lucia – has a GDP of 
1.72 billion USD. The smallest country in the currency union – Dominica – has a 
GDP of 0.61 billion USD. This represents a spread of 1.1 billion USD, with 
Dominica having an economy36 percent the size of Saint Lucia. Now let us 
consider the nations that make up the GCC. Saudi Arabia has a GDP of 679 billion 
USD, whereas the smallest country in the GCC – Bahrain – has a GDP of 34 
billion USD. This represents a spread of 645 billion USD, with Bahrain having an 
economy close to only 5 percent the size of Saudi Arabia. 
 
 
Figure 2. GDP of Eastern Caribbean Central Bank Member States in Billions of USD, 2017 
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Although GDP size is not a direct indicator of the amount of money in 
circulation, it gives a general idea of proportion. A large economy tends to have 
more money in circulation than a smaller economy. While it is difficult to compare 
the exact sizes of money supplies in the GCC countries due to the different 
compositions of their money supplies, Saudi Arabia did in fact have the largest 
money supply in 2013 as well as the fastest growth rate (Pratap, 2013). 
The large difference in money supply between the GCC countries makes this 
profit redistribution scheme unsuitable for a potential currency union in the GCC. 
It provides little incentive for smaller GCC countries like Oman and Bahrain to 
participate in a monetary union. 
 Alessandra Casella of Colombia University found that “a small economy will 
not take part in the [monetary union] agreement unless it can secure influence that 
is more than proportional to its size and a transfer of seignior age revenues in its 
favor” (Casella , 1990). 
When considering a political make up like that of the GCC, with countries of 
extremely varied sizes, profit sharing is an essential piece of the currency union 
that will draw in the smaller countries. In the case of the ECCU, all the member 
nations are relatively close in size. This is not the case for the GCC. Therefore, a 
profit redistribution scheme based on money supply is unlikely to incentivize 
smaller countries in the GCC to join a monetary union. A reworked profit sharing 
formula must be proposed that disproportionately rewards the smaller nations in 
order to guarantee their participation. 
 
5. Malayan Currency Board (MCB) 
5.1. Basic Facts 
Unlike the other currency unions discussed, the Malayan Currency Board is no 
longer in existence. This currency board is considered because it was fairly 
durable, surviving the independence of its most populous member. The currency 
board also had unique features, which differed from that of other currency boards 
due to the Malayan currency board’s more limited powers. 
The British protectorates of the Malayan States and the British-ruled Straits 
Settlements formed the Malayan Currency Board (MCB) in 1938. The Malayan 
States had been using Straits Settlements currency without a share in the profits the 
Straits Settlements generated from issuing the currency. The MCB permitted them 
to share in the profits. The MCB used the former exchange rate of the Straits 
Settlement dollar,$1 Malayan to 2 shillings and 4 pence sterling, or $50 Malayan to 
£7 (George, 2016). This rate was specified in the agreement establishing the MCB, 
as was a reserve ratio of 100 to 110 percent, to be held in British securities, British 
Empire securities other than those of the participating governments, or other assets 
approved by the British Secretary of State for the Colonies. 
The Malayan Currency Board was first headquartered in Singapore, where the 
Straits Settlements currency board had been, but moved to Kuala Lumpur in 1962, 
keeping an office in Singapore.  
During World War II the territories of the MCB were under Japanese 
occupation, but the MCB held its assets in London, out of reach for the Japanese, 
and resumed operations after the war. In 1946 the separate protected states of the 
Malayan peninsula united to form the Malayan Union. In 1952 Brunei, Sarawak, 
and British North Borneo joined the MCB, occasioning a revision of the MCB 
agreement. Malaya became independent in 1957 and there was another revision of 
the agreement in 1960 to remove certain powers formerly exercised by British 
colonial officials. In 1963, Malaya, Sarawak, North Borneo, and Singapore united 
to form Malaysia. Friction within the federation led to Singapore’s expulsion from 
it in 1965. The currency board ceased operation in 1967. 
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5.2. Legal Matters and Governance 
The 1938 constitution of the Malayan Currency Board established the Board of 
Commissioners of Currency Malaya, which was made up of a maximum of five 
members. The members were appointed by the Governor of the Straits Settlements 
and the High Commission of the Malay States. The Commissioners of Currency 
were endowed with the sole ability to issue currency notes in the territories of the 
member states. The 1938 agreement did not specify any geographical distribution 
of the board of commissioners. The 1951 revision of the constitution specified one 
member each from Malaya, Singapore, and the combined territories of Brunei, 
Sarawak, and North Borneo, plus two persons agreed upon by the member 
governments and not representing any particular territory. The 1960 revision of the 
constitution gave Malaysia two members; Singapore, Brunei, Sarawak, and North 
Borneo one member each; plus one person agreed upon by all the member 
governments, with recognized banking or financial experience, and not 
representing any particular territory. 
The MCB was not a central bank, and accordingly it had no power to act as a 
lender of last resort to commercial banks. Until the revision of its constitution in 
1960, the MCB was expected to refrain from holding securities issued by member 
governments, and even after 1960, in practice it did not take advantage of its 
potential ability to hold domestic securities. 
 
5.3. Profit Sharing 
The MCB’s 1938 constitution implemented the Currency Fund Income 
Account, which tracked all of the revenue generated by the Malayan dollar. At the 
end of the fiscal year, expenses were deducted from this account and the surplus 
was funneled into the All Malaya (Currency Surplus) Fund. Each government in 
the union was entitled to a share of the fund as listed in Figure 3. The shares were 
determined by an expert committee, which based them on the expected circulation 
of Malayan currency in each jurisdiction, itself largely a function of the 
jurisdiction’s economic size. 
 
 
Figure 3. Distribution of Profits, Malayan Currency Board 
Source: Malayan Currency Board constitution, Singapore Government Gazette, October 14, 1938, p. 
2849. 
 
The agreement set the initial shares assigned to each government. Every five 
years, a new scale could be voted on and if agreed upon by governments with 
cumulative shares of over 75 percent, the new scale would take effect. If no new 
scale was agreed upon, the existing scale would stay in effect for the next five 
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years. In addition, any shortage in the Currency Fund Income Account had to be 
recouped by the governments in the union proportional to their outstanding shares.vi 
The MCB had no paid-in capital, so this provision was inserted in case of the 
unlikely event that the MCB’s high level of external assets turned out to be 
insufficient to meet demands for liquidation. 
 
5.4. Applying the MCB’s Profit Sharing Procedure to the GCC 
The MCB’s method of allocating profit shares could be better suited to the 
needs of the GCC than assigning shares based on capital. By assigning shares more 
flexibly, the GCC could have more control over how potential members are 
rewarded. For example, smaller countries such as Oman and Bahrain could be 
assigned larger shares of the surplus fund to induce them to join the currency 
union. In addition, the restructuring mechanism would work to the GCC’s benefit. 
Should the smaller countries start to catch up to the larger economies in the future, 
the shares could be rebalanced every five years to adapt to current conditions 
without having to adjust the capital contributions (George, 2016). 
 
6. European Union (EU) and European Central Bank (ECB) 
6.1. Basic Facts 
The European Union (EU), established in 1993 by the Maastricht Treaty, is a 
political and economic union that now extends to 27 European countries (Wilde, 
2017). The EU is also in part a currency union:19 member nations use the common 
currency, the euro, and the expectation is that the rest will join eventually, except 
Britain, which is negotiating to leave the EU. The monetary policy of the currency 
union is governed by the European Central Bank (ECB), headquartered in 
Frankfurt, Germany.  
The euro was launched as a unit of account in 1999, but not issued as cash until 
January 1, 2002. At inception, the cash was introduced at fixed conversion rates in 
the countries that adopted it. Between 1999 and 2002, the euro was an “invisible 
currency.”  
Today, the euro, like most mature economies’ currencies, is a floating currency. 
This means that its exchange rates are determined by market forces. However, the 
ECB still plays a major role in monitoring and maintaining the stability of the 
currency in the exchange markets (Smaghi, 2009). As for the assets held by the 
ECB at the end of 2016, €349 billion worth of assets were reported in its 
2016annual accounts.vii 
 
6.2. Legal Matters and Governance 
The main governing body of the ECB is the Governing Council. Members of 
the Governing Council include the Executive Board of the ECB and the governors 
of the respective national central banks. All members of the Executive Board 
receive a vote, but only 15 governors receive a vote. Once there are more than 22 
governors, article 10.2 of the ECB statute outlines a method through which voting 
rights are determined. In short, governors are ranked and placed in groups that 
receive a different number of voting rights per group, often fewer than the number 
of governors in said group. The rankings are determined by the relative share of the 
national central bank of the respective governor in the aggregate GDP of the 
European Union. The higher the share of a country’s GDP in the EU, the better its 
governor ranks and the higher the likelihood of him receiving voting rights. 
Governors within a grouping rotate voting rights.viii 
The responsibilities of this Governing Council are described in Article 10. The 
Governing Council is responsible for making decisions regarding the actions the 
ECB is mandated to conduct, establishing monetary policy, and intermediate 
monetary policy. The latter could include setting key interest rates and decisions 
relating to supplying ECB reserves. The Executive Board essentially implements 
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decisions made by the Governing Board and relays information to the national 
central banks. 
The ECB has some organizational features that should be considered by the 
GCC union, and others that should be avoided. Placing governors on a voting 
rotation established by their countries’ share of the aggregate GDP could be 
entirely destructive to the goals of the currency union. If implemented in the GCC, 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia would have a great advantage over the remaining, 
relatively smaller countries of the GCC. Saudi Arabia represents 47 percent of the 
aggregate GDP of the GCC.ix Should Saudi Arabia always have a governor, or at 
least more often than others, with voting rights on the Governing Board, it would 
have a bigger influence on decision making than other members of the union. This 
would be politically unsustainable and unrealistic considering historic resistance 
from other GCC countries towards a currency union for this very reason. (Note that 
in the euro area, Germany, the largest economy, only has 29 percent of the total 
GDP.x) 
One feature of the ECB that is applicable to the GCC union is the use of the 
Executive Board as an implementation tool. The Executive Board serves to 
“execute” decisions made by the Governing Board, instead of being an additional 
decision-making hurdle. This could serve as a model for the GCC union as it offers 
a tool for carrying out decisions. Having a central body that coordinates among the 
national central banks would offer a streamlined and efficient method of carrying 
out policy decisions. 
 
6.3. Profit Sharing 
In the ECB statute, Article 28 states that the capital holdings of the ECB shall 
be €5 billion as of the establishment of the ECB. Currently, the capital holdings of 
the ECB stand at €10.8 billion.xiArticle 29 details the Key for Capital Subscription, 
in which the shares of the capital holdings are distributed among the member 
nations. This is calculated as the sum of: (1) 50 percent of the share of its 
respective Member State in the population of the Community in the penultimate 
year preceding the establishment of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) 
and (2) 50 percent of the share of its respective Member State in the gross domestic 
product at market prices of the Community as recorded in the last five years 
preceding the penultimate year before the establishment of the ESCB. Later, 
Article 33 states that all “Monetary Income” – income generated by the execution 
of monetary policy – shall be redistributed to the member states in proportion to 
their paid-up shares.  
 
6.4. Applying the ECB Model to the GCC 
Let us use the format dictated by Article 29 to see how these numbers would 
play out in the GCC. First, each country’s share of the total GCC population using 
the most recently collected census data from the Gulf Labour Markets and 
Migration Programme are as follows: 
 
Table 1. Population Shares of GCC Statesxii 
Country Date/Period Total Population Share of Total Pop. 
Bahrain mid-2016 1,423,726 2.68% 
Kuwait 31 Dec 2016 4,411,124 8.31% 
Oman 7 April 2017 4,599,051 8.66% 
Qatar Feb 2017 2,673,022 5.03% 
Saudi Arabia May 2016 31,742,308 59.76% 
United Arab Emirates mid-2010 8,264,070 15.56% 
Total  53,113,301 100% 
 
Next, we calculate each country’s 2017 GDP as a share of the whole GCC’s 
aggregate GDP using the IMF Data Mapper as a source: 
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Table 2. GDP Shares of GCC States 
Country GDP (bn USD) Share of Total GDP 
Bahrain 33.873 2.34% 
Kuwait 118.271 8.17% 
Oman 71.931 4.97% 
Qatar 166.346 11.49% 
Saudi Arabia 678.541 46.87% 
United Arab Emirates 378.656 26.16% 
Total 1447.618 100% 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook (2017) 
 
Finally, we average the two percentages to get the capital key percentages for 
each country: 
 
Table 3. Capital Shares of Prospective GCC Central Bank, Calculated Like ECB Shares 
Country Share of Total Pop. Share of Total GDP Capital Key % 
Bahrain 2.68% 2.34% 2.51% 
Kuwait 8.31% 8.17% 8.24% 
Oman 8.66% 4.97% 6.81% 
Qatar 5.03% 11.49% 8.26% 
Saudi Arabia 59.76% 46.87% 53.32% 
United Arab Emirates 15.56% 26.16% 20.86% 
Total 100% 100% 100.00% 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
This model employed by the EU has its advantages. The first is the uneven 
distribution of capital contribution. It is an advantage because the member nations 
must also contribute capital to the central bank in proportion to their shares. In our 
above example Saudi Arabia, the largest economy in the GCC and Middle East, 
would contribute 53.32 percent of the capital holdings of the central bank. If Saudi 
Arabia were to continue using the EU as an analogue, a capital of €10.8 billion 
would result in a Saudi contribution of €5.8 billion. The largest economy in the 
union would be putting up the largest upfront capital. Smaller countries in the 
union like Oman and Bahrain would be incentivized by this structure, as they 
would not have to put as much capital at risk. Saudi Arabia might be getting the 
most of the redistributed profits, but it would also be taking on the biggest financial 
burden. 
The second advantage of this model is its dynamic nature. By using GDP and 
population as the determining factors for capital contribution, a country’s share of 
the central bank’s capital holdings can grow if its economy grows relative to other 
union members. This factor will incentivize countries in the union to grow their 
economies to obtain a higher share of their central bank’s capital holdings and the 
profits associated with it. 
That being said, this model also comes with disadvantages. Since the capital 
being contributed to the currency union’s central bank is coming from the member 
nations’ existing capital holdings at their own central banks, the capital 
contribution could be seen as a simple repositioning of funds. Assuming that each 
country had enough capital holdings currently to fulfill its contributions to the 
central fund, no new capital would need to be generated. If this perspective is 
taken, there would be zero risk in transferring existing funds to another bank that is 
under the country’s purview. Not only that, but each country would still have legal 
ownership of the capital it contributed, represented by its share in the joint central 
bank. As a result, the differing capital contributions could be seen as 
inconsequential and not seen as a motivating factor for smaller countries. 
The risk here lies in the collective management of the joint central bank. If 
poorly managed, the contributed capital could be lost. Since the money would not 
be managed by the national central banks, distrust could sow doubt. In addition, 
countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which would contribute the most capital, 
might feel a greater sense of investment in the union and attempt to control it. We 
have seen examples in the past of the larger countries of the GCC strong-arming 
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the smaller ones. The recent tensions between Qatar and the rest of the GCC 
resulted in the expulsion of Qatari nationals from Saudi Arabia and the UAE. This 
disproportionate contribution effectively equalizes the economic strain placed on 
the member nations, but does little to alleviate political tension. 
 
7. CFA Franc Zone 
7.1. Basic Facts 
The CFA Franc Zone is a combination of two currency unions: the Central 
African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), whose central bank is the 
Banque des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale (BEAC) and the West African Economic 
and Monetary Union (WAEMU), whose central bank is the Banque Centrale des 
Etas de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (BCEAO). Figure 4 is a map of the members of both 
unions. 
Both unions trace back to the Banque de l’AfriqueOccidentale, a Paris bank that 
issued notes throughout French colonies in Sub-Saharan Africa. During World War 
II French Equatorial Africa aligned with the Free French government in exile and 
issued a currency distinct from that issued by the Banque de l’AfriqueOccidentale 
in French West Africa, which remained aligned with the French wartime regime in 
Vichy. The division persisted after the war and the independence of most of French 
colonies in 1960. Guinea and Mauritania left the currency unions and established 
their own central banks, but the former Spanish colony of Equatorial Guinea and 
the former Portuguese colony of Guinea-Bissau later joined the unions. 
Each union has its own central bank, issuing currencies that are distinct but both 
called the CFA franc. Each union has a separate treaty with France with similar 
features and policies. The CFA franc is pegged at 655.957 CFA francs per euro. 
The rate was previously pegged at 100 CFA francs per French franc, and the rate 
with the euro is the cross rate that existed when France joined the euro area. 
 
 
Figure 4. Map of the CFA Franc Zone and Its Two Central Banks 
Source: IMF – “The CFA Franc Zone: Common Currency, Uncommon Challenges,” Anne Marie 
Gulde, 2 April 2008. 
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7.2. Legal Matters and Governance 
Initially France had half the votes on the boards of directors of BEAC and 
BCEAO. In 1972 and 1973 revisions of the central bank constitutions reduced 
France to a single vote, like the African member countries. Arguably the most 
notable part of the agreements between the two currency unions and France today 
is that France guarantees the conversion rate of the two currencies. The French 
Treasury holds a special operations account for the central banks, which serve as a 
source of overdraft capacity should a reserve shortage occur (Gulde, & 
Tsangarides, 2008).  
However, this deal comes with three caveats. The first is a requirement for 20 
percent of the central banks’ sight liabilities to be held in foreign exchange 
reserves. The second is a requirement for 50 percent of those foreign exchange 
reserves to be held in the French Treasury’s operations account. The third is an 
interest rate hike should an overdraft occur. 
What this deal accomplishes for the currency unions is increased stability. Della 
Corte et al., (2015) found that exchange rates depreciate when there sovereign risk 
shocks. By offering WAEMU and CEMAC a pegged exchange rate, it insulates the 
two unions’ currencies from sovereign risk. This provides much needed stability in 
the region, especially when considering that several member nations are exporters 
of oil, which is subject to volatile swings in prices. 
Despite the provisions to safeguard the exchange rate of the CFA franc, it was 
devalued in 1994 from 50 per French franc to 100 per French franc. The central 
banks were not sufficiently vigorous in following the rules. They lent excessively 
to government enterprises and depleted their foreign reserves. France refused a 
bailout without a devaluation and a promise to tighten oversight. The CEMAC and 
WAEMU economic unions are intended to help keep that promise. 
The extensive French involvement in the CFA franc zone since its beginning 
and continuing through today has no potential analogue for the GCC countries. 
Despite its long history and relatively successful record of maintaining a pegged 
exchange rate with its anchor currency, it does not seem to be a good example from 
which to draw lessons for a GCC monetary union. 
 
8. Conclusions 
8.1. Type of Monetary Authority 
Whatever the potential merits of a currency board, it does not seem to be in the 
cards politically for the GCC. Excluding Saudi Arabia, all the GCC members once 
had currency boards, which they have since replaced with central banks. All now 
have people with the managerial capacity to operate central banks and all seem to 
want the degree of discretionary monetary policy that central banking offers, in 
particular the ability to serve as a lender of last resort to commercial banks. 
Accordingly, the analysis here has focused on a joint central bank. 
 
8.2. Legal Matters and Governance 
Perhaps the most applicable voting model of the central banks and currency 
board mentioned in this paper is that of the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank. One 
member is appointed from each member country and each member has an equal 
vote. A simple majority is required to pass decisions. This can serve to be a great 
equalizer between the political powerhouses of the GCC. Countries with more 
political power like Saudi Arabia or the UAE threaten to dominate the smaller 
countries of the GCC in the decision-making arena. Although the countries’ 
economic sizes are nowhere near proportional, giving them equal votes in the 
currency union would incentivize the smaller members to join. In the Eastern 
Caribbean Currency Union, the member nations were relatively similar in size, so 
giving them equal votes was less of an issue. However, implementing an equal-
vote arrangement in the GCC could prove to be a powerful motivator for political 
unity and success. Perhaps it would be desirable to combine equally weighted 
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voting with a supermajority provision so that certain decisions could only be made 
by agreement of more than half of the member countries’ representatives on the 
governing board. (Since the GCC has six members, a six-member board could not 
take action unless at least four countries agreed on a measure; a 3-3 tie would result 
in no action.) That being said, it is worth noting that the legal structure of the 
ECCB could prove to be a hindrance to the GCC union’s overall progress. Having 
two layers of governance within the central bank – a Board of Directors and a 
Monetary Council – allows redundancies and inefficiencies to arise. Given the 
historical evidence of the GCC’s ability to quickly make decisions, adding extra 
layers of bureaucracy will inhibit the central bank’s agility in response to economic 
developments. Here, adopting a similar approach to that of the ECB might be more 
beneficial. Having an Executive Board carry out the decisions made by the 
Governing Council offers an attractive solution to the efficiency problem. 
Centralizing decision-making to a single body of members to then be carried out by 
another group would streamline the roles of each governing body.  
 
8.3. Profit Sharing 
The capital contribution model implemented in the ECB is of particular interest 
when considering the best option for the GCC. As discussed in a previous section, 
using this model in the GCC would result in Saudi Arabia putting up the most 
capital. This is an attractive aspect of the currency union to the smaller economies 
of the GCC, as they would be taking a smaller share of the risk. However, the 
profit payback scheme employed by the ECB might not be the most appealing to 
them. That being said, it is reasonable for the country taking the most risk to be 
reaping the most rewards. In addition, the beauty of this model is its adaptability. 
As countries continue to grow, should the economic composition of the GCC shift 
in the favor of some country other than Saudi Arabia, they would be compensated 
as such. Profit sharing need not be tightly linked to capital contributions. The profit 
sharing scheme used in the Malayan Currency Board is enticing as it offers a 
degree of flexibility and agency that is not present in the ECB. The members of the 
currency union can decide the share of capital that each country must contribute 
and consequently how much they are compensated for doing so. Using a more 
arbitrary system for determining profit sharing could incentivize smaller countries 
like Oman by giving them a disproportionate share of the profits. The advantage of 
this system as the MCB used it is that it can be changed on a five-year basis, so the 
profit sharing can be used as a short to medium term tool to incentivize greater 
political will for joining the union by offering economic compensation. 
 
8.4. Choice of Exchange Rate 
As with any kind of union, there are many aspects that all contributing parties 
must agree on, one of which being the choice of exchange rate. As we have 
discussed above, in the case of the GCC there are many political tensions 
surrounding these decisions and they must be made carefully to ensure political 
unity. When it comes to exchange rate, not rocking the boat may be the best option. 
Most countries in the GCC are currently pegged to the dollar, the exception 
being Kuwait. It would be far more difficult to convince six governments to agree 
on a new exchange rate rather than to convince only Kuwait to adopt a pegged 
currency. Not only is it possibly the easiest political solution, but it is also a sound 
exchange rate choice regardless. Other options such as pegging to the price of oil 
or a basket of currencies can be more volatile. If the GCC countries were to decide 
later that it would be better for their currency to float, they could do so. Malaysia 
and Singapore both moved from currency boards to pegged exchange rates under 
central banking and eventually to floating rates. The ECB is the only currency 
union among those surveyed here that was floating from the start. 
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8.5. Choice of Headquarters 
While perhaps a less critical choice, the choice of the location for the central 
bank headquarters serves as a political symbol. In previous discussions, Saudi 
Arabia insisted that the central bank be headquartered in Riyadh. Though this 
might make the most sense as Saudi Arabia would be the largest contributor to the 
currency union, there are already tensions from the smaller nations regarding Saudi 
Arabia’s tendency to use its size to dominate negotiations. A concession from the 
Saudis on the headquarter location could serve as an olive branch to the other 
nations and a symbol of its willingness to cooperate. A headquarters would work 
just as well in any of the other nations, but special consideration should go toward 
the UAE and Kuwait as they are more established as international financial hubs. 
As was the case with the Malayan Currency Board, it would be possible to 
establish one or more branch offices in addition to the headquarters, both for 
business and political reasons. 
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